Drafts of my recent work are available for presentation and discussion:
(Title redacted due to review) In this paper, I explore a distinct kind of aspiration—the desire to align beliefs and judgments with one’s ideal self-conception. I discuss why this phenomenon presents unique challenges for self-knowledge theories and the ethics of belief. I propose a self-knowledge account based on the diachronic attitude of commitments to constitute our diachronic beliefs. I also introduce a unique non-epistemic reason overlooked in the ethics of belief literature.
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(Title redacted due to review) I offer a critical examination of the current accounts of intentions which argue that we have in advance knowledge of intentions and that we know we will succeed without needing to see what we do. I argue that it cannot be true in the case of commitments which necessitate more complex knowledge about our own psychology in order for us to reliably predict that we would follow through on our commitments. I propose an externalist solution, arguing that knowledge of commitments comes after observing our regular patterns of actions.
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(Title redacted due to review) I discuss current views according to which we can completely know our intentions even when we do not follow through on them. In contrast, I show the same evidence from changes of mind or weakness of will undermines or outright proves a lack of commitment.
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(In Progress for Submission) I discuss that if a theory of moral responsibility fails to take into account how our moral communities make it more difficult for us to perceive the wrongdoing as such, then it will be less compelling as an account of moral responsibility. However, if a theory of moral responsibility does not recognize the role of individuals in improving their moral community, then it cannot recognize the active role the agents play in changing moral norms either. I will consider some solutions from ideology critique education to creating more egalitarian forms of social organization to assess under what conditions we can expect agents to know better.
DISSERTATION
Knowing Oneself In Action: An Account of Self-Knowledge of Beliefs and Commitments
Each of us holds numerous judgments, beliefs, intentions, and commitments. How do we know what they are? This dissertation focuses on the question of how the self-knowledge of judgments, beliefs, intentions, and commitments is acquired and justified. Self-knowledge of those attitudes is crucial for us, not only because they constitute the core of who we are but also because they play a moral role in our relationship with one another. For instance, whether someone has discriminatory or misogynistic thoughts might get in the way of fair treatment in her job, so knowing about it may help prevent the wrongdoing. This project holds practical significance as it addresses our criticism of others' lack of self-knowledge regarding their own beliefs and commitments. The kinds of attitudes I will focus on here are those attitudes that are morally significant to us or valuable in the Delphic Oracle’s sense of ‘Know Thyself’. I call those beliefs and intentions that have significance both for ourselves and our relationship with others “ethical attitudes.” My account is reserved for the self-knowledge of those morally significant and character constituting attitudes. What does it take for an agent to take epistemic responsibility to gain self-knowledge of those significant attitudes? That is the central question I focus on in this dissertation.
I offer an account of self-knowledge that explains both the significance of first-personal endorsement of judgments and decisions as well as the significance of gaining knowledge of one’s diachronic reasoning and action patterns. I do this by arguing that, contrary to what the contemporary literature on self-knowledge has highlighted, we need to appeal to a more nuanced, complex attitude of commitments than “judgment” as the first personal view proposed, or gathering theoretical knowledge about oneself as the empiricist view emphasized. I discuss that the present theories overlook the fact that agents who take responsibility for their intentions and beliefs care about what they believe and intend. As Frankfurt (1971) famously argued in the case of desires, “persons” as opposed to “wantons” care about what they desire to desire. I further argue that to the extent agents care about their beliefs and intention, they take up commitments to their judgments and decisions. Caring about our morally significant or character constituting beliefs and intentions cannot be understood merely by judging whether P is true or deciding whether to Φ. It requires a complex, moral attitude of commitment to diachronically act and reason in the way one values. I argue that “commitment” is a reliable, but not infallible way to know one’s significant beliefs and intentions. Commitments require an agential diachronic attitude that is directed to intentionally judging over time and intentionally acting over time, and therefore having an unalienated self-knowledge and avowing our attitudes is something we do by being committed to making judgments and decisions in the way we value.