

# Merve Rumeysa Tapınç

## *Curriculum vitae*

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### Areas of Focus

Area Of Specialization

**Ethics, Epistemology, Philosophy of Action, Social and Political Philosophy**

Area of Competence

**19<sup>th</sup> 20<sup>th</sup> Century Continental Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy**

Area of Teaching Competence

**Medical Ethics, Ancient Greek Philosophy, Philosophy of Art**

### Academic Appointments

2024 Fall

**Tufts University, Part-Time Lecturer**

### Education

2024

**Boston University** Ph.D. Philosophy

2012

**Boğaziçi University** M.A. Philosophy

2008

**Istanbul Bilgi University** B.A. Comparative Literature

### Publications

#### **Journal Articles and Book Chapters**

2025

Tapınç, Merve R. “Knowing Your Commitments in Action” (Accepted Jan-3-2025 in *Episteme*, in editing process)

2018

Tapınç, Merve R.(2018) Perceptual and Intuitional Experience in Merleau-Ponty and Bergson, Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 27:129-136

2017

Tapınç, Merve R. (Invited & in Turkish) “Kuramsal Bilgi ve Algısal Deneyim”, Dünyanın Teni, ed. Zeynep Direk, Metis Yayınevi. (Title Translation: “Theoretical Knowledge and Perceptual Experience”)

2015

Tapınç, Merve R. (2015) “Perception and time-experience in Merleau-Ponty and Bergson”, *Kaygı*, Uludağ Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Felsefe Dergisi, 23, 163-184.

## Works in Progress

- 2024 Tapınç, Merve R. “How Do We Have Delphic Self-Knowledge?” (Under Review)  
2024 Tapınç, Merve R. “Epistemology of Commitments: Knowledge of Fit Between Our Minds and Actions” (Under Review)  
2024 Tapınç, Merve R. “Alienation and Avowal of Ethically Significant Beliefs” (Under Review)  
2024 Tapınç, Merve R. “The Limits of Ideology Critique and Moral Ignorance” (Under Review)

## Teaching Experience

### MAIN INSTRUCTOR Tufts University

- 2024 Feminist Philosophy,  
2024 Introduction to Philosophy

### Boston University Metropolitan College

- 2024 Existentialism

### Emerson College

- 2023 Free Will, Responsibility and Agency

### Boston University

- 2018 Ancient Philosophy

### Istanbul Technical University

- 2013-4 Philosophy of Art

### TEACHING ASSISTANT

#### Boston University

- 2022 Existentialism, Walter Hopp  
2021 Medical Ethics, Rachell Powell  
2018-9 Intro to Ethics, Victor Kumar  
2016 Introduction to Philosophy, David Roochnik

#### Boston University Questrom Business School of Business

- August 2020 Negotiations, Kristine Smith Crowe  
Fall 2022 Ethical Leadership in the Global Economy, David Epstein

#### Harvard University

- 2019 Happiness, Susanna Rinard

#### Harvard Extension School

- 2021 Intro to Philosophy, Ben Roth

## Presentations & Conferences

- 2025 “Doxastic Aspirations and Ethics of Belief”, Symposium, Central APA  
2024 “Ethics of Belief and The Responsibility to Know Oneself”, 3rd Workshop in Analytic Philosophy, Organized by Poedat. <https://www.poedat.org/3-analitik-felsefe-calistayi/>  
2024 “Epistemic Aspirations and Self-Knowledge” Boston University, Philosophy Department  
2024 “Knowing Your Beliefs is Valuing Your Beliefs” Poster Presentation, Eastern APA

- 2023 A Multidisciplinary Roundtable on Marriage, Singledom, Family, Intimacy and Gender. Organized by Joanna Davidson and Dinah Hannaford: “Opting Out: Women messing with Marriage Around the World”. October 2023
- 2023 “Social Conditions of Moral Responsibility” Yale Early Career Ethics
- 2022 “Self-Knowledge of Commitments”, International Conference on Self-Consciousness and Self-Awareness ICSCSA on April 22-23, 2022 in London, United Kingdom
- 2019 “Bergson and the Singularity of Duration”, The Unique, the Singular and the Individual: The debate about the Non-Comparable, Claremont University, February 2019

### APA Conference Comments

- 2022 Complicity and the problem of individual causal efficacy by Corey Katz Eastern APA
- 2021 Intellectual Courage and Inquisitive Reasons, Will Fleisher, Central APA

### Awards, Fellowship and Grants

- 2020 PhD Summer Pilot Program by Post-Doctoral Affairs Summer (500\$)
- 2019 Non-Service Summer Fellowship (5000\$)
- 2016-2017 Boston University Dean’s Fellowship (20.000\$)
- 2019 The Unique, the Singular and the Individual: The debate about the Non-Comparable, Claremont University (Grant for the Paper Presentation for the conference). (2000\$)
- 2016 The Maria Stata Professorship Grant in Classical Greek Studies (2000\$)

### Equity, Diversity and Departmental Services

- 2023-2024 First-Gen Faculty Training/ Mentorship
- 2021-2023 Diversity and Climate Committee Officer
- 2021-2022 Minorities and Philosophy Program Coordinator

### Interview

- 2021 [Interview for BUCH as a Representative Grad Student from Philosophy Dept.](#)

### Research Assistant

- 2020 Research Assistant at BU Summer 2020.
- Prepared annotated bibliography for Daniel Dahlstrom’s research on the concept of expression, 1970-2022.
- 2018 Research Assistant at BU Spring 2018,

- Indexed for Juliet Floyd’s book: Wittgenstein and Turing, Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics

2014-2015

Research Assistant Tubitak Project 114K348, *Concepts and Beliefs: From Perception to Action*.

## Graduate Coursework

\*denotes audit

### BOSTON UNIVERSITY

*Philosophy of Mind*, Walter Hopp  
*Topics in Aesthetics*, Allen Speight\*  
*Speculative Philosophy*, Daniel Dahlstrom  
*Ancient Philosophy*, David Roochnik  
*Plato, Theaetetus*, Marc Gasser-Wingate  
*Philosophy of Language*, Juliet Floyd  
*Moral Epistemology*, Michaela McSweeney  
*Fanaticism and Ethics*, Paul Katsafanas  
*History of Ethics*, Aaron Garrett

### HARVARD

*Self-Knowledge*, Richard Moran\*  
*Philosophy of Action*, Richard Moran\*  
*Hume*, Christine Korsgaard\*

### MIT

*Feminist Thought*, Sally Haslanger\*

## References

Walter Hopp

Professor of Philosophy

Boston University

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Daniel Dahlstrom

Allen Speight

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Victor Kumar (Teaching Letter)

Assist. Professor of Philosophy

Boston University

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Richard Moran

Professor of Philosophy

Harvard University

[moran@fas.harvard.edu](mailto:moran@fas.harvard.edu)

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## Dissertation Summary

How do we know our morally significant beliefs and commitments that shape our character, as the Oracle of Delphi advises us to “Know Thyself”? We ordinarily both take ourselves to have and aspire to have certain beliefs and commitments. We might aspire to truly believe in gender equality and have commitment to write a book. It is also very important to us that we get these facts right about ourselves. Knowing which beliefs and commitments we hold, which we aspire to hold, and whether there is an epistemic gap between them, is an important component of personal integrity and wellbeing.

I identify two central challenges in achieving Delphic Self-Knowledge. One challenge is the *problem of indifference* which arises when agents know their dispositional beliefs and akratic actions but do not care about them. According to the problem, there is some proposition P about yourself such that (a) you are in possession of (robust) evidence that P but (b) you do not care about your belief that P. I discuss that the empiricist views, according to which, we know our beliefs by observing how we reason in relevant circumstances, faces the problem of indifference. The second challenge is the *problem of epistemic irresponsibility*, which arises when agents believe that they have a belief or a commitment on the basis of insufficient evidence from their conscious judgements and decisions. I discuss that the first-personal views face the problem of *epistemic irresponsibility* because they claim that judgement about what is true and decision about what to do are sufficient for self-knowledge of having a belief and a commitment.

I further argue that to account for a phenomenon of what I call “doxastic aspiration” which arises when moral agents aspire to have certain beliefs, we need an account of self-knowledge that avoids both the problem of indifference and epistemic irresponsibility. Empiricist theories defend a dispositional account of beliefs, yet, if epistemic aspirants are alienated from their dispositional beliefs, then those dispositional beliefs are not an expression of their ‘real self’. Aspirant self-knowers care about their beliefs, and if we care about our beliefs, we take responsibility for building those beliefs. Although the first personal views emphasize *taking responsibility* for our beliefs, I show that the attitude of judgement is neither an expression of what we care about nor a responsible means to form a belief.

I offer a self-knowledge account that bridges the gap between the first-personal and empiricist views by explaining both the significance of caring about one’s attitudes (thereby avoiding the problem of

indifference), but also the significance of knowledge of carrying out responsibility for one's beliefs and intentions (thereby avoiding the problem of epistemic irresponsibility). I do this by arguing that contrary to what the contemporary literature on self-knowledge has highlighted, we need to appeal to a more nuanced diachronic attitude of "commitment" rather than an episodic attitude of "judgment," or gathering theoretical knowledge about one's beliefs. I argue that commitments as expressions of what we value distinguish beliefs we aspire to have from the alienated, dispositional beliefs. I go on to argue that because commitments do not involve know-how knowledge of what we do, we need to learn about how we can succeed to achieve our commitments. I conclude that we need knowledge of fit between what we take ourselves to be committed to and our actions, to know whether we in fact act in the way we are committed to.